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Often, security requirements for complex systems 
are hard to discern because it is difficult to determine 
which requirements must be allocated to the system 
and which pertain to the system environment.  In the 
Common Criteria framework, threat analysis results in 
a set of objectives that can be subdivided into two 
major categories: those allocated to the system itself, 
and the remainder to the environment.  By 
differentiating between these two types of objectives, it 
is possible to avoid inappropriate requirements 
specification.  Moving beyond systems intended to 
undergo evaluation, we show that the Common 
Criteria methodology is effective in requirements 
analysis for informally specified systems.  As a 
demonstration, a worked example using a Common 
Criteria-based process for a requirements analysis of 




When constructing a system from the ground up, 
developers are routinely faced with the challenge of 
evolving changes in the system description.  Since the 
design process is fundamentally iterative, insights 
gained often feed back to the design or system 
functionality.  In many systems, this process results in 
a set of informal (ad hoc) security requirements.  To 
judge the soundness of these informal requirements, a 
coherent requirements derivation methodology is 
needed.    
The Common Criteria (CC) is an international 
standard for security evaluation of IT systems [1].  The 
CC is often perceived as overly complex due to its 
large collection of interdependent functional 
requirements and the varying degrees of formality 
required for different levels of assurance.  This 
perception has been a challenge to CC acceptance in 
the software engineering domain.  However, recent 
research in applying the CC in the context of software 
requirements engineering suggests the usefulness of 
the CC within the mainstream software community 
[2][3]. 
Although the CC is not a panacea for all security 
engineering issues, using its paradigmatic process in an 
iterative approach provides a sound and practicable 
method for capturing and analyzing security 
requirements for systems that lack formal requirements 
specification procedures.  A coherent security 
requirements derivation process can be devised based 
on the CC security environment paradigm and 
requirements analysis methodology.  When combined 
with the CC requirements expression rules, while 
abandoning the strict use of its construct and language, 
this requirements derivation process provides an 
effective roadmap to constructive and methodical 
expression of informal security requirements.    
The CC approach to security requirements 
development is to analytically derive the requirements 
from a set of security objectives that address all aspects 
of the system’s security environment.  The system’s 
security environment is defined in terms of inherent 
threats, axiomatic security assumptions about the 
environment, and organizational security policies.  The 
CC further refines the concept of security objectives 
into two classes: Target of Evaluation (TOE) 
objectives and environment objectives.  (The CC refers 
to the system that is the subject of evaluation as the 
TOE).  The environment objectives are often 
overlooked or misunderstood because the developers 
must infer the operational goals of the system to 
properly define them.  For example, wide distribution 
of project material is a typical expectation of an open 
source project.  However, depending on the nature of 
the project, the operational goals of its distribution 
system will differ, resulting in dissimilar security 
objectives for the system and its environment.  
Distributing project material on an unrestricted website 
is sufficient for an educational project, but is not 
acceptable for a collaborative and, in some instances, 
rivalrous research project where different levels of 
disclosure control are needed.  For the latter case, the 
security objective that requires the distribution system 
to enforce some form of user access control is 
commonly understood by the developers.  But having 
system objectives alone is not enough.  Security 
objectives should also be defined for the environment 
in which the distribution system operates.  These will 
provide access control supporting mechanisms such as 
secure user registration and proper marking of access 
control attributes.  Environment objectives such as 
these are easy to miss. 
Since the security objectives are used to derive the 
requirements it is critical that they are correctly defined 
and allocated to the system or to the environment.  If 
the security requirements are improperly declared, the 
end system, even if well-engineered, will not satisfy 
the intended operational goals. 
Requirement specifications for informally defined 
systems often concentrate on functional requirements 
that describe the system’s capabilities and 
performance.  Non-functional requirements specifying 
the system’s constraints and quality are rarely given 
sufficient attention, leading to difficulties in obtaining 
the expected level of rigor and robustness for the target 
system.  The CC defines a structured requirements 
expression method that addresses this shortcoming.  In 
the CC taxonomy security requirements are defined in 
terms of functional and assurance (non-functional) 
requirements.  
This paper describes how the Common Criteria was 
utilized as a guiding tool for the security requirements 
analysis and development of the Trusted Computing 
Exemplar (TCX) Dissemination System.  Common 
Criteria and TCX requirements are presented, followed 
by a concept design for the initial implementation of an 
XML-centric web-based dissemination system.  A 
threat analysis of the proposed system, development of 
the system requirements, and generation of a high level 
design specification are included.  The design 
specification was used to implement an initial 
prototype.   
 
2. Dissemination requirements elicitation 
 
Two sets of high level requirements drive the need 
for a specialized dissemination system: those of the 
Common Criteria and those of the Trusted Computing 
Exemplar (TCX) project [4]. 
 
2.1.  Common Criteria requirements 
 
For high assurance products, trusted distribution, as 
specified in the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation 
Criteria (TCSEC) [5], mitigates two threats: tamper 
during Trusting Computer Base movement and 
distribution of a counterfeit system [6].  Technical 
measures and procedures must exist to assure that all 
customer updates distributed are identical to the master 
version [5]. 
The Common Criteria-based Separation Kernel 
Protection Profile (SKPP) [7] extends these 
requirements for a class of high assurance kernels.  It 
outlines procedures for both the initial distribution and 
subsequent updates to the TOE and its components.  
The TOE is required to include procedures and tools to 
verify that the on-site version of the TOE matches the 
master distribution version [7].   
The TCX Separation Kernel will meet trusted 
delivery requirements using the TCX Dissemination 
System.  
 
2.2.   TCX requirements 
 
The TCX project is intended to demonstrate the 
application of a high assurance development 
methodology to the construction of products 
evaluatable against the highest evaluation assurance 
level defined by the Common Criteria.  The TCX 
project includes four related activities: (1) creation of a 
reusable high assurance development framework, (2) 
development of a reference-implementation trusted 
network component, (3) support for evaluation of the 
reference component against the highest assurance 
criteria, as defined in the Common Criteria (EAL7), 
and (4) open dissemination of the results of the first 
three activities [8]. 
The reusable development framework and open 
dissemination objectives establish conditions that the 
TCX Dissemination System must address. 
The development framework includes a high 
assurance rapid development environment that consists 
of tools and procedures including a documentation 
integration environment used to construct and manage 
the TCX project documents.  XML will be used for 
authoring project documents.  The use of XML paves 
the way for fine-grained access control during 
dissemination. 
A primary objective of the TCX project is its global 
availability.  In addition, geographically distributed 
project collaborators and evaluators need access to 
releasable project artifacts.  While other open source 
projects make their project material available on 
unrestricted websites [9][10][11][12][13], the TCX 
project requires a controlled dissemination 
environment. 
The open dissemination requirements for the TCX 
project include mechanisms for continuous 
contribution, evaluation and distribution of various 
project configuration items and deliverables [4].  The 
TCX Dissemination System must adhere to Common 
Criteria requirements for high assurance trusted 
delivery defined by the SKPP.  The TCX 
Dissemination System must be web-based and able to 
disseminate XML documents, source code, and project 
artifacts in various formats with integrity and 
confidentiality protection.  Additionally, the 
Dissemination System must provide group-based 
access control for different areas of the online site.  
Finally, the system must provide an easy to use 
interface for user access and data download.  
 
3. Dissemination requirements analysis 
 
The concepts and relationships of the method used 
to derive the security requirements for a target system 
are depicted in Figure 1.  The requirements derivation 
process is a series of hierarchical refinement activities 
that starts with a description of the target system 
including its purpose, concept of operation, conceptual 
architecture, and system access policy.  Next, the 
system’s security environment is defined in terms of 
environmental assumptions, anticipated threats, and 
organizational security policies.  Analysis of the 
security environment results in a set of security 
objectives that must be addressed by either the target 
system or its operational environment.  The system and 
environment objectives together should satisfy the 
intended functional goals and purpose of the target 
system.  Last, the security requirements that implement 
the established objectives and are levied on both the 
target system and its environment are developed.  This 
process is iterative and requires the results of a given 
activity be traceable to the derived elements from the 
last higher activity.  The traceability is demonstrated 
by the evidential material defined as rationale 
description in the CC mapping framework.  If 
discrepancies exist, the results of a particular activity 
are invalidated and the process repeats at the previous 
adjacent activity. 
This section describes this process in the context of 
the TCX Dissemination System.  
 
3.1.   High level system description 
 
Materials from the TCX project will be 
disseminated on the Internet to users.  The 
Dissemination System protects dissemination material 
from unauthorized access and ensures that users will 
receive the material with a guarantee of integrity and 
version, as specified by the trusted delivery 
requirements of the Separation Kernel Protection 
Profile [7].  The Dissemination System must support 
multiple users with varying degrees of access to 
materials of differing sensitivity.  Thus, a single 














Figure 1. Requirements derivation process 
3.1.1. Dissemination environment concept of 
operation.  The process by which material is installed 













































































Figure 2. Dissemination environment  
During development, files are labeled with 
ensitivity markings.  In Step 1, labeled materials are 
ubmitted to Configuration Management (CM), where 
hey are digitally signed.  The TCX project will 
rovide specific users with an external signature 
erification tool for checking the integrity of their 
ownloaded material.  In Step 2, the TCX 
onfiguration Control Board submits a dissemination 
olicy database to CM.  In Step 3, the project manager 
enerates a Releasable Items List (RIL) that specifies 
hich documents may be released through the 
Dissemination System.  The RIL is passed to the 
Releasing Agent (Step 4).  The Releasing Agent 
obtains the dissemination policy database and the 
signed materials from CM (Step 5).  In Step 6, the 
Releasing Agent exports all releasable material, the 
RIL, and the policy database to the Dissemination 
System.  The Dissemination System retrieves or 
updates its signed digital certificate from the CA (Step 
7), and the user database (described in the next section) 
from the web server (Step 8).  All externally generated 
data (i.e., Steps 6 through 8) are transferred to the 
Dissemination System via secure means.  At this point, 
the Dissemination System is ready for operation.  
The Dissemination System has two types of users: 
public users and registered users.  Public users can 
only access non-proprietary project material.  Figure 3 
shows the user access flow for registered users and the 
retrieval of restricted project material.  The user must 
first register with the CISR Web Server to obtain a 
unique user name and password before accessing 
dissemination material (Step 1).  Once registration is 
complete, the user information is exported to the 
Dissemination System (Step 2).  Finally, in Step 3 the 
user accesses material on the Dissemination System by 













Application utilizes multiple databases (depicted in 
Figure 3) to perform its dissemination task.  
 
3.1.3. System access control policy. Access to 
dissemination material will be based on the group to 
which the user belongs:  
• TCX system administrators will be able to access 
all material necessary for the performance of their 
jobs.   
• TCX developers will have read access to the 
material that they create.  
• Evaluators will have read access to official 
material.  
• External engineering collaborators will have read 
access to engineering releases and jointly-
developed documents.   
• NIST/NSA validators will have sufficient access 
to evaluation evidence, documents, and code 
necessary for validating the system evaluation.   
• Customers will only have access to documents that 
are deemed appropriate per their use licenses.   
• The general public will have the most restricted 
access to data.   
 
The web application server uses access control lists 
to regulate the data available to different groups.  Web 
server login is required for access to restricted 
material. No login is required for access to public 
material.  Configurable audit functions will allow for 
auditing of user identification, accesses, and other 
events.   
 
3.1.4. Document marking and viewing. XML tags 
will be used for access control markings.  When 
material cannot be parsed as XML, for example source 
code and binaries, then XML document descriptor files 
will be used to store the markings.  For each user 
group, the Dissemination System produces an HTML 




















































Figure 3. User data access
 
.1.2. Dissemination system architecture. The 
issemination System consists of a commercial web 
rver platform (i.e., hardware, operating system and 
eb application server), the Dissemination 
pplication, and various supporting tools.  
The Dissemination Application (DA), on the 
issemination System, maintains the confidentiality 
nd integrity of the dissemination data, prepares 
aterial for dissemination, and is responsible for 
ebpage management.  The DA uses access control 
arkings on documents to generate the webpage 
pository.  A web interface provides the only external 
ccess to TCX project materials.  The Dissemination 
based on the policy database and the document 
markings. 
 
3.2.   Security environment  
 
In the CC paradigm, a threat analysis must consider 
the assumptions about the system and its environment, 
the threats to the system, and the organizational 
security policies that exist in the target environment.  
The assumptions are a means to narrow the threats and 
focus solely on the system being evaluated.  These 
three elements permit development of a threat model 
from which requirements can be derived.  In the 
context of this work, IT Environment describes the 
underlying hardware and software upon which the 
Dissemination System runs.  The Dissemination 
Environment is the Dissemination System and all of 
the entities described in Figures 2 and 3.  Preceding 
threats, assumptions regarding the system must be 
enumerated.  Threats to the Dissemination System 
were based on the threats to a standard web server [14] 
combined with additional threats resulting from the 
sensitivity of the information being transmitted.  The 
high assurance requirements of the TCX project 
account for additional threats that would not exist in a 
low assurance environment.  
Figure 4 shows the mapping of the assumptions, 
threats and policies to the security objectives defined 
for the Dissemination System.  The TCX 
Dissemination System security objectives analysis [15] 
provides a complete description of the mapping.   
 
3.2.1. Assumptions.  Several conditions are assumed 
to exist in the IT environment and Dissemination 
Environment. 
 
Figure 4. Security objectives mapping 
Physical security measures are assumed to be 
commensurate with the physical value of the data such 
that they will help mitigate attacks to the physical 
system.  System administration is performed locally 
and by non-hostile, appropriately trained, 
administrators who follow all administrative guidance.  
Since the Dissemination System is to be hosted by a 
server-type platform, it is assumed that the operating 
system, web server, and cryptographic libraries operate 
correctly such that the flow of data inside the operating 
system, web server, and cryptographic libraries will be 
correct, and the implementation of this software is not 
flawed.  System calls to the operating system will not 
result in incorrect Dissemination System behavior. 
  
3.2.2. Threats. Although twelve threats have been 
identified [15], only the threats related to the sample 
set of requirements discussed in Section 3.4 are 
described.   
Unauthorized access is the primary concern for the 
system (T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS).  A user may 
gain access to dissemination data for which the user is 
not authorized according to the dissemination control 
attributes of the data.   
The threat of altered data (T.ALTERED_DATA) 
must be mitigated.  The version of dissemination data 
received by the end user may differ from the master 
version of the releasable data maintained by the 
Dissemination System resulting in corrupted delivery.  
The threat of a system compromise 
(T.SYSTEM_COMPROMISE) must be mitigated to 
ensure that the data and code of the Dissemination 
System is not inappropriately accessed.  The 
realization of this threat could result in the improper 
dissemination of data to users.  The threat of a foreign 
entity masquerading as the Dissemination System 
(T.MASQUERADE) may also result in the 
misrepresentation of the Dissemination System’s 
controlled dissemination data. 
The developmental threats of poor design, poor 
implementation and poor test are all relevant threats to 
a newly developed system (T.POOR_DESIGN, 
T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION, T.POOR_TEST).  If 
the design or implementation is incomplete or poor, 
then potential threats become a reality on the system.  
Unintentional errors in the requirements specification, 
design or implementation of the Dissemination 
Application may occur, leading to flaws that may be 
exploited by a casually mischievous user or program.  
Poor testing of the system, once implemented, can 
leave security vulnerabilities on the system undetected. 
 
3.2.3. Organizational security policies. These 
policies define the security rules and acceptable use of 
the system within an organization, and help to maintain 
the integrity of the data.   
The P.ACCESS_BANNER policy requires the 
Dissemination System present a banner to all users 
describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any 
other appropriate information to which users consent 
by accessing the system.  The P.ACCOUNTABILITY 
policy requires that the users be held responsible for 
their actions while using the system.  The 
P.DATA__MARKING policy requires that all 
dissemination data be properly marked with 
dissemination control attributes.  This policy is pivotal 
to the secure dissemination of data. 
 
3.3.   Security objectives 
 
To address the threats, organizational security 
policies and assumptions defined by the Dissemination 
System, a set of security objectives for both the 
Dissemination System and its environment are 
required.  The Dissemination System’s security 
objectives are developed to mitigate the threats and 
implement the policies of the Dissemination System.  
The security objectives for the environment are created 
to address the assumptions about the environment in 
which the Dissemination System operates.  Only the 
objectives related to the sample set of requirements 
discussed in Section 3.4 are presented.  The mapping 
of these objectives to the related 
threats/assumptions/policies is summarized in Figure 4. 
 
3.3.1. Dissemination System security objectives. The 
O.ACCESS objective requires that the Dissemination 
System only disseminate information in accordance 
with the access control policy and ensure that 
dissemination material is properly distributed only to 
authorized users.  The O.SECURE_DELIVERY 
objective requires the Dissemination System to provide 
mechanisms that allows the authorized users to verify 
that the received material is from the TCX 
Dissemination System and that the distributed material 
matches the master version maintained on the 
Dissemination System.  The O.SYSTEM_ACCESS 
objective requires the Dissemination System to provide 
mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the 
system.  The O.USER_GUIDANCE objective requires 
that all necessary information for secure data access be 
provided to the users.  This includes guidance on the 
authentication methods used by the Dissemination 
System to authenticate itself to the clients.  The 
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN objective requires that 
the Dissemination Application design be sufficiently 
and correctly documented to ensure all functional 
requirements are satisfied.   
 
3.3.2. Environment security objectives. The 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING objective requires the 
IT Environment upon which the Dissemination System 
is built to ensure that the operating system, web server, 
and cryptographic libraries function as expected.  The 
OE.PHYSICAL objective requires the IT Environment 
to provide physical security to protect the 
Dissemination System and its data.  These environment 
objectives map to assumptions and do not levy any 
security requirements on the IT Environment.   
Conversely, the following two environment 
objectives impose security requirements on the IT 
Environment.  The OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION 
objective specifies that, in addition to the physical 
security, the IT Environment must also provide 
sufficient mechanisms to protect the data and memory 
on the Dissemination System during its storage and 
execution.  The objective OE.DATA_MARKING 
requires that dissemination control attributes be 
applied to dissemination data by the appropriate entity 
in the Dissemination Environment.  These control 
attributes are essential to the secure dissemination of 
data.   
 
3.4.   Security requirements 
 
In the CC taxonomy, functional and assurance 
requirements are organized into classes, families and 
components based on security objectives [1].  A class 
is the most abstract expression of the approach to 
satisfy a set of related security objectives.  A family 
within a class represents a logical grouping of 
requirements that collectively addresses a security 
problem associated with a subset of those security 
objectives.  A component of a family is a set of 
specific security requirements for a common security 
need.   
Although it is mandatory to use the CC-prescribed 
constructs for expressing security requirements, a 
TOE-specific extended construct can be used if the 
corresponding security objective(s) cannot be 
implemented by the predefined security requirements.  
Extended constructs are defined in terms of explicit 
requirements and the CC imposes strict rules on the 
expression of this type of requirements.  Specifically, 
the explicit requirements must be modeled after the 
predefined requirements with respect to the level of 
detail, clarity and verifiability. 
Navigating through the CC security requirements 
and their interdependencies can be daunting for 
software developers.  But the CC framework also 
provides an effective way to organize the requirements 
for systems that are not subject to evaluation.  For 
these systems, the predefined classes and families of 
functional and assurance requirements establish the 
structural foundation upon which informally defined 
security requirements can be derived and expressed.  
This approach was utilized to guide the security 
requirements engineering process for the TCX 
Dissemination System. 
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Figure 5.  Security functional requirements 
Figures 5 and 6 show the CC predefined classes and 
families relevant to the derivation of the security 
requirements of the TCX Dissemination System.  Leaf 
nodes represent the functional and assurance security 
requirements allocated to the different logical 
components of the Dissemination System.  Even 
though the CC constructs and language were only 
loosely followed, the CC requirement expression 
methodology was useful in capturing these 
requirements, especially with the environmental 
requirements often neglected in informally defined 
systems.    
A number of explicit requirements (shown as EXP 
in Figure 5) are necessary to express requirements that 
are unique to the Dissemination System.  An example 
of these explicit requirements is the requirement that 
the Dissemination Application must redact all 
releasable documents.  This unique requirement is 
represented as DA in the leaf node under the EXP 
family of the FDP class in Figure 5.   
The CC-prescribed security requirements rationale 
is an effective requirements validation technique to 
check for improperly specified objectives or 
requirements or both in addition to determining the 
validity of the explicit requirements.  During the 
course of the TCX Dissemination System development 
process, it was discovered that some of the system 
requirements could not meet the intended system 
objectives because the objectives were incorrectly 
defined and vice versa.  Reassessment of the original 
set of objectives and requirements yielded a number of 
new environmental objectives and requirements.   
As illustrated in Figure 2, the TCX dissemination 
environment consists of multiple entities whose 
security behaviors collectively contribute to the secure 
dissemination of TCX material.  Initially, an 
assumption (A.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY) was made 
about the trustworthiness and correctness of all entities 
in the environment other than the Dissemination 
System.  To satisfy this assumption, an environment 
objective (OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY) was created 
and additional security functional requirements were 
imposed on the Dissemination Application to address 
this environment objective.  
OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY requires the environment 
to ensure that entities in the dissemination environment 
other than the Dissemination System are trustworthy 
and perform their functions correctly.  During the 
requirements review phase, it was determined that the 
additional functional requirements were incorrectly 
defined because the Dissemination Application cannot 
vouch for the trustworthiness and correct functionality 
of any entity in the operating environment.  
Furthermore using assumptions to address 
DISSEMINATION SYSTEM
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Figure 6.  Security assurance requirements 
dependencies a system has on other components in the 
environment in order for the system to enforce its 
security policy is a misuse of assumptions [16].  This 
triggered three changes:  1) the reclassification of the 
A.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY assumption into a threat 
(T.ROGUE_ENTITY) that entities other than the 
Dissemination System may not be trustworthy thus 
resulting in the improper dissemination of data; 2) the 
redefinition of the OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY 
objective; and 3)  the addition of a security functional 
requirement on the dissemination environment.  The 
revised OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY objective requires 
the environment to ensure that all entities in the 
dissemination environment are trustworthy and protect 
both the dissemination data and the data they generate 
to support secure distribution.  The new functional 
requirement calls for the dissemination environment to 
ensure that all dissemination-related data generated by 
its entities is protected in situ and during transit. 
The above example reinforces the assertion about 
the usefulness of the CC methodology in the analysis 
and expression of informal security requirements that 
are critical but often overlooked.  The 
objectives/requirements traceability is further 
discussed in the following section. 
 
3.5.   Requirements to objectives mapping 
 
Each objective must be traceable to one or more 
security requirements whose purpose is to implement 
that objective.  However, all requirements will not map 
to a single objective.  
Table 1 is a partial mapping of the TCX 
Dissemination System requirements to security 
objectives [15].   
 
Table 1. Requirements/Objectives mapping 
PART I:  SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS MAPPING 
O.ACCESS:  The Dissemination System will ensure that 
users gain only authorized access to resources that it 
controls. 
A.4.1 The Dissemination System shall enforce the 
access control policy on all registered users and data on the 
system.  This policy shall be enforced based on the user ID 
and group membership for the data requested. 
C.2.1 The Dissemination Application shall enforce the 
policy based on the following dissemination file attributes: 
file type marking, file sensitivity marking. 
C.2.2 The Dissemination Application shall enforce all 
dissemination access control mechanisms on all 
dissemination material present on the server. 
C.2.4 The Dissemination Application shall redact each 
releasable document in accordance with the dissemination 
policy. 
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN:  The design of the 
Dissemination Application will be adequately and 
accurately documented. 
D.3.1 An informal high level design specification shall 
be developed for the Dissemination Application. 
D.3.2 The design of the Dissemination Application 
shall meet the functional requirements. 
O.SECURE_DELIVERY:  The Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms for users to verify that any data 
disseminated matches the master version maintained by the 
Dissemination System. 
C.2.3 The Dissemination Application shall not modify 
the digital signatures placed on the dissemination material 
by the Configuration Management system. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS:  The Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to 
it. 
A.5.1 The Dissemination System shall ensure that users 
are identified and authenticated in order to associate them 
with the proper security attributes while accessing data.  
Security attributes shall include but are not limited to the 
user’s identity and the group(s) to which that user belongs. 
A.5.2 The Dissemination System shall authenticate 
registered users based on their user ID and password. 
A.5.3 The Dissemination System shall authenticate 
users prior to allowing access to any non-public documents 
on the Dissemination System. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE:  The Dissemination System will 
provide users with the necessary information for secure 
data access. 
B.2.1 The user guidance shall describe the interaction 
between the user and the Dissemination System for proper 
retrieval of releasable data. 
B.2.2 The user guidance shall clearly present all user 
responsibilities necessary for secure use of the 
Dissemination System, including those related to 
assumptions regarding user behavior found in the access 
banner. 
PART II:  ENVIRONMENT REQUIREMENTS 
MAPPING 
OE.DATA_MARKING:  All dissemination data will be 
properly marked with access control attributes by the 
Dissemination Environment. 
F.2.1 The Dissemination Environment shall properly mark 
all dissemination data with access control attributes. 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING:  The internal 
implementation and execution of the Dissemination 
System’s underlying operating system, web server, and 
cryptographic libraries will run as expected. 
This objective addresses the assumption 
A.INTERNAL_PROCESSING and has no corresponding 
security functional requirement. 
OE.PHYSICAL:  Physical security, commensurate with the 
value of the Dissemination System and the data it contains, 
will be provided by the Dissemination Environment.  
This objective addresses the assumption A.PHYSICAL and 
has no corresponding security functional requirement. 
OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION:  The IT Environment will 
provide sufficient mechanisms to protect the Dissemination 
System’s data and memory during storage and execution.   
E.3.1 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to 
create or modify webpage content to authorized 
administrators. 
E.3.2 The IT Environment shall be capable of limiting 
the ability to create or modify server executable content. 
E.3.3 The IT Environment shall protect the 
Dissemination System’s private key from unauthorized 
modification and viewing. 
E.4.1 The IT Environment shall restrict all non-
administrative users of the Dissemination System from 
reading from and writing to the audit trail. 
 
The contrast in the mapping of 
OE.DATA_MARKING and OE.PHYSICAL 
illustrates the usefulness of applying the CC 
methodology to requirements analysis. The former 
results in a functional requirement levied on the 
environment, whereas the latter has no functional 
requirement.  The lack of functional requirement for 
OE.PHYSICAL stems from the fact that neither the 
Dissemination System nor the components in the 
environment can address the objective; instead it must 
be addressed through procedures.  On the other hand, it 
is necessary to levy the stated requirement on the 
environment for OE.DATA_MARKING because from 
the requirements derivation viewpoint, security-
relevant functions implemented by other components 
that affect the Dissemination System’s ability to 
enforce its security policy must be considered as part 
of the Dissemination System.   Since the access control 
attributes used by the Dissemination System to enforce 
the dissemination policy are externally applied to the 
data, security requirements must be levied on the 
environment to ensure that data marking is correctly 
implemented by the other components. 
 
4. Initial implementation 
 
The Dissemination System was implemented on a 
server platform running a Linux-based operating 
system.  It consists of three major components: (1) the 
Web Server managed access control, audit logging, 
authentication, SSL protected connections, and web 
hosting; (2) the Dissemination Application supported 
audit logging, project artifact redaction, sweeping for 
non-releasable content, and web page management; 
and (3) the Administrative Tools supported audit log 
analysis, audit log rotation, and execution daemons. 
The Apache Web Server was configured to host the 
test dissemination website.  To enforce group-based 
access controls, Apache basic authentication was used.  
The use of the Apache rewrite engine support for 
runtime URL manipulation forced selected Webpage 
Repository directories to require SSL connections. 
Administrative and supporting tools included: 
logrotate, to support audit log archiving; webalizer, for 
audit analysis; crond, to schedule the former two tools, 
OpenSSL, to generate public-private key pair and 
certificates; and linkcheck.pl, to support the 
elimination of broken symbolic links.  
Both web server functional testing and tool testing 
were performed.  Test scenarios exercised user 
authentication, group-based access controls, and 
HTTPS connections for non-public web content.  
Tools were confirmed to provide the proper 
Dissemination System support.  
 
5. Future work and conclusion 
 
Version 3 of the Common Criteria was recently 
released for public review [17].  The concept of IT 
environment has been revised and security objectives 
are now described in terms of the development 
environment and the operational environment.  An 
interesting observation is that security requirements for 
the operational environment are optional in this new 
version.  Future work on the Dissemination System 
includes a thorough analysis of the new requirement 
derivation paradigm.  
Another related future work item is to enhance our 
development methodology with a tracking scheme to 
record the evolution of the objectives and 
requirements.  In the current effort, the provenance of 
revisions was not captured, nor was it required by the 
CC.   The collected statistics will provide quantifiable 
metrics of the efficacy of the CC Version 3 
requirement derivation paradigm. 
For secure software development, a holistic 
approach towards security requirements derivation and 
expression is needed.  Non-functional (assurance) 
requirements must be considered along with functional 
requirements.  The Common Criteria defines a security 
analysis methodology that is useful to express security 
requirements for both formally and informally defined 
systems.  This work focuses on the latter.  The CC 
methodology helps place limits and disciplines to the 
practice of developing security requirements from an 
informally stated system description such that the 
requirements can be systematically derived, 
represented and organized.  This paper presented the 
TCX Dissemination System as a worked example of 
this proposition.  Starting with a high level description 
of the TCX Dissemination System, a CC-based 
requirements derivation process was used to translate, 
through analysis, the high level system requirements 
into a set of informal security requirements for both the 
Dissemination System and its environment.  The CC 
requirements expression rules were loosely followed to 
help organize and represent these security 
requirements.  A number of improperly specified 
objectives and requirements were discovered and 
redefined as the result of iteratively applying the CC 
traceability methodology.  The worked example shows 
that the CC processes and rules can be soundly adapted 
and integrated into the requirements derivation 
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